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INTRODUCTION 
Procedure, Appei.ii daughter 
Shr '*r ~r"~tA ^txuj.uns» LUI a itjjiec* " ' • rt. i on of 
^ v . ^ . . -* en te red <"»« M a " iny I II.JI-
Salt Lake County Mental Health I"SLCMH' immune from s u i t under 
I I n II it 11 r> r n i i i t M i l i I I i n i i i i i i i i I U l l , 
( 
Prior 
et. seq. (the Act). In that portion of its decision dealing with 
the governmental immunity defense raised by SLCMH, the Court 
stated: 
Both plaintiffs and defendants agree that UMC and SLCMH 
were performing governmental functions within the meaning 
of the Act. Therefore, they are immune from suit unless 
the Act waives that immunity and does not provide an 
applicable exception to that waiver. 
Hiqqins v. Salt Lake County, et al., No. 900255, Slip Op. at 12 
(May 14, 1993). 
The Court's statement on this point which was key to its 
immunity ruling was erroneous. Specifically, the Court 
misapprehended or overlooked Appellant's consistent and repeated 
argument that SLCMH was not performing a governmental function. 
The Court's statement that Appellant agreed, i.e. admitted, SLCMH 
was performing a governmental function was critical to the Court 
affirming summary judgment on an issue that the Trial Court did not 
reach. 
A rehearing on this point is required. Appellant never 
admitted, much less agreed, that SLCMH was performing a 
governmental function. In fact, Appellant expressly and repeatedly 
asserted the SLCMH conduct at issue was non-governmental and relied 
on the applicable opinions from this Court for her position. For 
the reasons now fully set forth below, we respectfully ask the 
Court to grant a rehearing on this issue. 
2 
POINT I 
A p p E L L A N T N E V E R ADMITTED THAT SLCMH WAS 
PERFORMING GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS WITHIN 
THE MEANING OF THE ACT AND, IN FACT, 
HAS ALWAYS ASSERTED TO THE CONTRARY 
This rnnrl e r roneous ly toumJ I IIi 1  il Appellant admit ted t h e 
U n i v e r s i t y Medical i miter1 nnr1 SLCMH were performing governmental 
l l L i l l l . l I I I II II III III III II I i l l III 1 1 1 i I > III l l III III III V I 111 II ( I I I U l| II II III ,i I J I I I I I I 1 ! I l l i n l i l I M I I i | | p l l , J l ' r | M l 
c o n s i s t e n t l y dis|nil i ill I li i-> i i • HI HI1-) immunity ant I iiiiif' I impor tan t ly , 
a s s o r t e d t Iiiiif niiPMH wan nni |n»rformi 111j i i]overnmentaL i u n c t i o n . ' 
I in example r with ii/ipui I In I lie SLCMH argument, tha t i t s a c t s were 
"ill i i c r e t i o n a r y " gover IIIIKMII ill i u n c t i o n s fox WIIILII t h e n 
mi i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i in II , i » i , | i ( m i III III in in in III in mi i ) i i i i i i II 
Appe l l an t a s s e r t s -*-- rof SLCMH] t o not admit or 
commi t Tru j i11o were not governmental and t h e 
Governmental Immunity Act does not app ly . 
lllliiMilliill,, nf Appellant hi Sl.fMll all ?1 (nm]ihasit. addeiliii i 
with in I ' i»* MI i to the claim t h a t a n o t i c e was r equ i red u 
C o v e r in in in*" 1 1 1 i in II II li in mi mi in mi mi in in in mi I I / Il A 1 1 1 Ill II 1 1 1 I I n r s P r t ed : 
The University Medical Center, now dismissed, did not J J L|IJIi;11 
the immunity defense and settled this case without a brief. 
I n addi 11 on I: :: as sert ing there was not a government a 1 
function,, Appellant :: 'J t: = •  ::i :: c .ses from other jurisdictions disputing 
that the conduct of SLCMH was "discretionary" and disputing the 
applicability of the "assault and battery exception." Reply of 
Appellant to SLCMH at 21. Appellant did not i ntend to exclude or 
limit the position that a governmental fuiiction was not being 
performed when these cases were cited. 
3 
The Act, in 1984 only required notice of governmental 
functions. Shultz v. Conger# 755 P.2d 165 (Utah 1988). 
An essential governmental function is only one which 
government can perform. Id. The courts have widely held 
that treating, evaluating and hospitalizing the mentally 
ill can be performed by a private health care provider 
and universally dismiss the assertion of governmental 
immunity to defeat a victim's claim. 
Brief of Appellant to SLCMH at 20. 
Further, in responding to the Amicus Curiae Brief of Valley 
Mental Health, a private corporation now serving as the successor 
to Salt Lake County Mental Health, Appellant indicated: 
Valley's appearance as an amicus curiae is a way for Salt 
Lake County Mental Health to argue its case twice. 
Valley's appearance really serves as an example of the 
misapplication of the government immunity principles by 
Salt Lake County Mental Health. Salt Lake County Mental 
Health has consistently argued that it is entitled to 
"governmental immunity." This argument denies that 
"governmental immunity" applies where a function is 
undertaken "which only government can perform." 
Standiford v. Salt Lake City 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980). 
Since Appellant's claims arise out of activities which 
can be performed by non-governmental entities like 
Valley, and since the activities are "not exclusively 
governmental", there can be no immunity. See Shultz v. 
Conger, 755 P.2d 165 (Utah 1988). 
Reply of Appellant to Amicus Curiae Valley Mental Health, Inc. 
at 4. [emphasis added] 
Appellant took the very same position in the Trial Court. In 
opposition to summary judgment Appellant wrote: 
It is also clear that immunity will not be a bar if the 
conduct out of which the injury arises is not an 
"essential governmental function." Clearly, the decision 
to admit a patient is not something only the government 
can perform. 
4 
Pit's, Menu in Opp. Summ. J. at 49. In response to the argument 
that an immunity notice was required, Appellant noted: 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Statute and its notice 
requirements come into play only where "essential" 
governmental functions are involved. Shultz v. Conger, 
755 P.2d 115 (Utah 1988). It is clear the conduct out of 
which plaintiff's claim arises is not conduct which 
constitutes an essential governmental function. 
Pit's. Mem. in Opp. Summ. J. at 53. 
The Trial Court never reached the governmental immunity issues 
because it held there was no duty, a decision which this Court 
reversed. This Court did not inquire about immunity in oral 
argument and focused only on the duty issue. Its decision on this 
point has overlooked or misapprehended Appellant's position. 
Accordingly, a petition for rehearing should be granted. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT IS SOUNDLY BASED ON 
CONTROLLING PRECEDENT IN THIS JURISDICTION 
Appellant's position that SLCMH was not performing a 
governmental function in the treatment of Caroline Trujillo to 
protect Shaundra Higgins was based on opinions from this Court. 
The Legislature passed the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code 
Annotated SS 63-30-1 -38 (1953 as amended), in 1965, but did not 
define "governmental function" until 1987. 
Thus, at the time this case arose in 1984, the only definition 
for governmental function was found in Utah case law. In the case 
of Bennett v. Bow Valley Development Corp., 797 P.2d 419, 420 (Utah 
5 
1990)/ the Court traced the history of "governmental functions" and 
the precise situation of a claim that arose before 1987: 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§S 63-30-1 to -38 (Supp. 1985), establishes governmental 
immunity "for any injury which results from the exercise 
of a governmental function," subject to various statutory 
waivers. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3. In 1987, the 
legislature enacted its own definition of "governmental 
function." See § 63-30-2(4)(a) (1989). However, since 
this case arose prior to that enactment, we consider the 
definition of governmental function solely under case law 
applicable before the 1987 amendment: 
This Court has held that the test for 
determining a governmental function for 
governmental immunity purposes "is whether the 
activity under consideration is of such a 
unique nature that it can only be performed by 
a governmental agency or that it is essential 
to the core of governmental activity." 
Standi ford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 
1230, 1236-37 (Utah 1980). We later 
elaborated that the Standiford test "does not 
refer to what government may do, but to what 
government alone must do" and includes 
"activities not unique in themselves . . . but 
essential to the performance of those 
activities that are uniquely governmental." 
Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 629 P.2d 432, 
434 (Utah 1981) (emphasis in original). 
Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784 
P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989). 
The activities out of which plaintiff's claims arise when the 
facts are construed in her favor involve Salt Lake County Mental 
Health's failure to meet appropriate standards of care in treating 
Caroline Trujillo to protect Shaundra. The conduct at issue and 
the duty to protect recognized by the Court do not involve the 
exercise of a function that only government can perform or that is 
essential to the core of government. Rather, the duty recognized 
6 
by the Court involves conduct engaged in by all mental health 
professionals that render services in the private as well as the 
public sector. Where a breach of the duty can be shown, the 
government is held to the same standard as a private individual. 
Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49, 51 
(Utah 1983). 
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully submitted that this Court should 
grant this petition for rehearing. 
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This opinion is subject to revision before final ""*' •* * iJ^J 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. CLYDF PRATT 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
Kathy Lynn Higgins, individually No, 900255 
and as guardian ad litem for 
Shaundra Higgins, her daughter, F I L E D 
Plaintiff and Appellant, May 14, 1993 
v. 
Salt Lake County, William 
Kuentzel, Sheryl Steadman, 
The University of Utahf The 
University Medical Center, 
Caroline Trujillo, and John 
Does 1 through 10, 
Defendants and Appellees. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Leonard H. Russon 
Attorneys: Rodney G. Snow, James L. Warlaumontf Neil A. Kaplan, 
Stephen G. Stoker, Salt Lake City, and David B. 
Thomas, Provo, for the Higginses 
David E. Yocom, Patricia J. Marlowe, Salt Lake City, 
for the County 
Ronald E. Nehring, Salt Lake City, for Valley Mental 
Health 
Stephen J. Hill, Salt Lake City, for University of 
Utah and University Medical Center 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
This case is before us on appeal from summary judgment 
in favor of defendants Salt Lake County, Dr. William Kuentzel, 
Sheryl Steadman, and the University of Utah. Plaintiff Kathy 
Lynn Higgins, who is suing individually and as guardian ad litem 
for her daughter Shaundra Higgins, argues that the trial court 
erred in ruling that defendants owed no duty to protect either 
her or her daughter from a potentially dangerous mental patient. 
We conclude that the trial court erred in finding no duty but 
affirm the lower court's summary judgment on the alternative 
ground that governmental immunity bars Higgins's action. 
Before we recite the facts, we note that in reviewing a 
grant of summary judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. E.g., Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 468 
(Utah 1992); Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Utah 
1991); Utah State Coalition of Senior Citizens v. Utah Power & 
Light, 776 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1989). We state the facts in this 
case accordingly. See Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 
212, 215 (Utah 1992). 
On April 10, 1984, Carolyn Trujillo, a voluntary 
patient at Salt Lake County Mental Health ("SLCMH"),x stabbed 
then ten-year-old Shaundra. Trujillo had been diagnosed as a 
paranoid schizophrenic with organic brain dysfunction and 
marginal intelligence. Her mental illness manifested itself when 
she was a teenager and was complicated by her abuse of illegal 
drugs. Prior to the stabbing, she had been an involuntary 
patient four times at the University of Utah Medical Center 
("UMC") and twice at the Utah State Hospital. In late 1975, 
following Trujillo/s release from her first hospitalization at 
UMC, Sheryl Steadman, a registered nurse, was assigned as 
Trujillo's primary therapist. 
In July of 1981, Ogden police charged Trujillo with 
assault and disorderly conduct after she struck a woman and a 
child. Trujillo pleaded guilty in an Ogden court to disorderly 
conduct. Before sentencing, however, she stabbed an elderly 
woman in the buttocks in Salt Lake City and was charged with 
aggravated assault. The Salt Lake court committed her to the 
Utah State Hospital for a thirty-day evaluation to determine her 
competency to stand trial. On December 1, 1981, she was found 
incompetent to stand trial on the aggravated assault charge and 
pleaded no contest to the reduced charge of simple assault 
several days later. She was placed on probation for one year. 
As a condition of probation, Trujillo was ordered to enter a 
residential mental health program at Salt Lake County's Adult 
Residential Treatment Unit ("ARTU11") in Salt Lake City. 
In February of 1982, the Ogden court placed Trujillo on 
one year's probation in connection with the disorderly conduct 
charge. As a condition of probation, Trujillo was ordered to 
take her medications and continue her treatment at ARTU. In 
January of 1983, Trujillo,s probation officer recommended that 
both the Ogden and Salt Lake City probation orders be terminated 
because Trujillo had complied with the conditions of both. Her 
1
 Salt Lake County Mental Health consists of three mental 
health systems: Salt Lake, Granite, and Copper Mountain. Each 
system was established by Salt Lake County; the three were 
consolidated in approximately 1982 to form Salt Lake County 
Mental Health. 
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probations in Ogden and Salt Lake City were subsequently 
terminated• 
In February of 1984, Trujillo superficially cut her 
wrists. Two days later, she and her mother went to the UMC 
emergency room and requested that Trujillo be hospitalized. The 
request was denied, allegedly due to a shortage of beds, but Katy 
Jones, a crisis specialist on the UMC staff, referred Trujillo to 
ARTU for a crisis stay. When Trujillo arrived at ARTU on that 
Saturday, Larry Romero, a crisis line operator who was not 
authorized to diagnose patients, created a treatment plan for 
Trujillo that called for a short stay to assess her living 
environment. Dr. Joy Ely, a part-time psychiatrist at ARTU, saw 
Trujillo the following Monday. Trujillo was discharged from ARTU 
on March 14, 1984, and was placed in an evening/weekend program, 
a move calculated to ease her transition from the institution to 
society. She attended several, but not all, sessions through the 
end of the month and last saw Steadman on March 21, 1984. At 
this meeting, Steadman found Trujillo to be stable. 
On April 10, 1984, Trujillo was alone at her home when 
she heard voices telling her "to stab someone." She left the 
house and began walking toward a nearby alley. When she spotted 
Shaundra, a child she knew from the neighborhood, she followed 
the girl into the alley next to her house. Trujillo called to 
Shaundra and then stabbed the girl three times, severing her 
aorta and puncturing her abdomen. Despite her injuries, Shaundra 
survived the attack. 
Higgins claims that Trujillo had been brooding over and 
planning to hurt Shaundra for six months before the attack. 
However, in an interview with police detectives after the 
stabbing, Trujillo said that she had no particular victim in mind 
when she armed herself with a knife and left her room. She told 
the detectives that she intended to stab "[j]ust anybody." In a 
subsequent interview, Trujillo told a psychiatrist that even 
though she was not looking for Shaundra at the time of the 
stabbing, she believed that Shaundra had struck her six-year-old 
daughter. She also said that she hated Higgins because Higgins 
refused to give her cigarettes and was "a slut." 
Trujillo was found "guilty and mentally ill" of the 
charge of attempted criminal homicide, a second degree felony, 
and was committed to the Utah State Hospital.2 Shortly 
thereafter, Higgins sued Salt Lake County and the University of 
Utah, claiming that they owed her and her daughter a duty to 
2
 After spending approximately nine months in the Utah State 
Hospital, Trujillo appeared in court again and pleaded guilty to 
attempted manslaughter, a third degree felony. She was then 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a term not to exceed five 
years. 
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control and/or to treat Trujillo correctly and that if defendants 
had performed their professional duties properly, the stabbing 
would not have occurred. Higgins sought damages for her own 
emotional distress and for physical and emotional injuries to her 
daughter. 
Higgins asserted the following specific allegations of 
negligence as a basis for her suit. First, she contended that 
the University of Utah was negligent in its treatment of Trujillo 
in that UMCs crisis specialist, nurse Jones, was negligent in 
her diagnosis, treatment, and failure to have Trujillo 
involuntarily committed or voluntarily admitted to the hospital 
after her suicide attempt. Particularly, Higgins asserted that 
Jones (i) never reviewed Trujillo's medical records, (ii) did not 
involve qualified personnel in evaluating Trujillo, and 
(iii) never evaluated Trujillo's threat to others in the 
community. 
Second, Higgins contended that Salt Lake County was 
negligent in its diagnosis, supervision, treatment of, and 
failure to commit Trujillo. Specifically, she alleged that 
(i) therapist Steadman prescribed improper medication for 
Trujillo, (ii) crisis worker Romero was unqualified to diagnose 
or create a treatment plan, and (iii) Dr. Ely was unqualified to 
handle Trujillo,s case and failed to review Trujillo's medical 
records or consult with qualified personnel. The trial court 
granted summary judgment for defendants on the ground that they 
owed no duty of care to either Higgins or her daughter. Higgins 
appeals. 
We first state the applicable standard of review. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of 
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Sandv citv, 827 P.2d 
at 214; Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1159; Landes v. Capital Citv Bank, 
795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990). Because entitlement to summary 
judgment is a question of law, no deference is due the trial 
court's determination of the issues presented. However, we may 
affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the 
trial court, even if it is one not relied on below. See Hill v. 
Seattle First Nat'l Bank. 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992). 
With this standard in mind, we turn to the issues on 
appeal, which are as follows: First, assuming that defendants 
may have failed to use reasonable care in treating, supervising, 
diagnosing, and not committing Trujillo, did defendants owe a 
duty to the Higginses, and if so, did such acts and omissions 
breach that duty? Second, even if there was such a breach of 
duty, does the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-10, bar Higgins's claims? We discuss these issues in 
Mo. 900255 4 
turn. As the trial court recognized below, the proper sequence 
of analysis is to determine, first, whether defendants had a duty 
to the Higginses and, if so, whether they breached that duty, and 
second, whether governmental immunity shields defendants from 
suit. Rollins. 813 P.2d at 1162 n.3. 
We begin with the question of defendants' duty to the 
Higginses. Duty is an essential element of negligence. E.g., 
Rollins. 813 P.2d at 1159; Ferree v. State. 784 P.2d 149, 151 
(Utah 1989); Beach v. University of Utah. 726 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 
1986). Unless defendants owed a duty to.the Higginses, there is 
no cause of action. Higgins advances several theories upon which 
to base a finding of duty. These theories have two basic 
conceptual themes: first, that defendants owed a general duty to 
any third party foreseeably at risk from their negligence in 
treating and supervising Trujillo, and second, that a special 
relationship existed between defendants and Trujillo that gave 
rise to a duty by defendants to the Higginses. 
We reject the first of these grounds as being contrary 
to established precedents in this and other states. As we 
recently explained, "Because people are inherently less 
controllable than physical things, the common law has imposed no 
duty to control the conduct of others except in certain 
circumstances, as where a special relationship exists."4 Traoo 
v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 835 P.2d 161, 161 (Utah 1992). The 
soundness of this limitation on liability as it operates in the 
context of a patient/therapist relationship is plain. First, 
given the empirically demonstrated inability of trained health-
care professionals to reliably predict future dangerousness, the 
legal limitations on the involuntary confinement of mental 
patients, and the need for a confidential relationship between 
care providers and patients for therapy to succeed, the general 
duty that plaintiffs would have us impose would be both 
3
 Higgins also claims negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. However, we find no reason to address this claim 
because it is disposed of by Hansen v. Sea Rav Boats. Inc.. 830 
P.2d 236 (Utah 1992). 
4
 For similar reasons, we reject Higgins's related argument 
that we should extend the duty imposed on doctors for negligent 
treatment of infectious or contagious diseases to the 
psychotherapist's negligent treatment of a dangerous patient. 
This attempted analogy fails for the following reasons: First, 
infectious diseases are generally more identifiable than 
dangerous mental illness; second, there is more certainty of harm 
with an infectious disease than from a patient who may be labeled 
"dangerous"; and third, the means of preventing harm from an 
infectious disease are usually less restrictive of personal 
freedom than the means used to prevent harm from those with 
mental illness. 
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realistically incapable of performance and inconsistent with the 
basic relationship between therapist and patient. See Jerome S. 
Beigler, Tarasoff v. Confidentiality, 2 Behav. Sciences & L. 273, 
277-79 (1984) [hereinafter Beigler]; John G. Fleming & Bruce 
Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma. 62 
Cal. L. Rev. 1025, 1044-45 (1974) [hereinafter Fleming & 
Maximov]; Mark J. Mills, The So-Called Duty to Warn: The 
Psychotherapeutic Duty to Protect Third Parties from Patients' 
Violent Acts, 2 Behav. Sciences & L. 237, 241 (1984) [hereinafter 
Mills]; David L. Faigman, To Have and To Have Not: Assessing the 
Value of Social Science to the Laws as Science and Policy, 38 
Emory L. Rev. 1005, 1076 (1989). 
Second, in part because the proposed duty is 
incompatible with the real world environment in which patients 
and health-care professionals coexist, this ill-defined, 
amorphous duty would invite jury hindsight bias. See Robert F. 
Schopp & David B. Wexler, Shooting Yourself in the Foot with Due 
Care; Psychotherapists and Crystallized Standards of Tort 
Liability, J. Psychiatry & L. 163, 165 (Summer 1989) [hereinafter 
Schopp & Wexler]. The resulting duty to the general public would 
"closely approximate a strict liability standard of care, and 
therapists would be potentially liable for all harm inflicted by 
persons presently or formerly under psychiatric treatment." 
Cooke v. Berlin. 735 P.2d 830, 836 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting 
Bradv v. Hopper. 570 F. Supp. 1333, 1339 (D. Colo. 1983), aff'd, 
751 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984)); accord Abernathv v. United 
States, 773 F.2d 184, 190 (8th Cir. 1985). 
Finally, we note that these defendants are public 
entities or employees who are charged with protecting the well-
being of the general public. See Qbray v. Malmberg, 484 P.2d 
160, 162 (Utah 1971). However, ,f[f]or a governmental agency and 
its agents to be liable for negligently caused injury suffered by 
a member of the public, the plaintiff must show a breach of a 
duty owed him for herl as an individual, not merely the breach of 
an obligation owed to the general public at large bv the 
governmental official." Ferree, 784 P.2d at 151 (emphasis 
added); accord Owens v. Garfield. 784 P.2d 1187, 1189 n.2 (Utah 
1989). 
Higgins presents us with no persuasive reasons for 
departing from our precedents and sacrificing these important 
policy considerations. We refuse to adopt the general negligence 
scheme they propose. 
The second ground for the Higginses' claim of duty, the 
special relationship theory, requires more extended analysis. 
Higgins argues that defendants had a "special relationship" with 
Trujillo that gave rise to a duty to keep her from harming third 
parties that were foreseeably at risk from her, including the 
Higginses. Because an understanding of the special relationship 
doctrine is crucial to this discussion, we begin with a brief 
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review of the concept. Section 315 of Restatement (Second) of 
Torts sets out a formulation of this doctrine. It provides two 
exceptions to the general rule that one has no duty to control 
the conduct of third persons. Section 315 states: 
There is no duty to control the conduct of a 
third person so as to prevent him [or her] 
from causing physical harm to another unless 
(a) a special relation exists 
between the actor and the third person 
which imposes a duty upon the actor to 
control the third persons conduct, or 
(b) a special relation exists 
between the actor and the other which 
gives the other a right to protection. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1977). These exceptions are 
further elaborated upon in sections 314 and 319 of the 
Restatement. See Rollins. 813 P.2d 1159-60. 
In Utahf we have applied the Restatements special 
relationship exception to the general rule that there is no duty 
to control the conduct of third persons. See Rollins. 813 P.2d 
at 1159. However, unlike the Restatement writers, we do not 
attempt in our duty analysis to rigorously maintain the 
artificial categorization that differentiates between cases based 
on whether the actor owes the duty to the victim or to the 
victimizer, e.g.. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 314, 315, 319, 
nor do we apply the Restatement's precise formulation 
uncritically. Instead, we have taken a policy-based approach in 
determining whether a special relation should be said to exist 
and consequently whether a duty is owed. Rollins. 813 P.2d at 
1161; Ferree, 784 P.2d at 151-52; Beach, 726 P.2d at 415; see 
Owens, 784 P.2d at 1193 (Zimmerman, J., concurring specially, 
joined by Hall, C.J., and Howe, Assoc. C.J.). 
Determining whether the actor has a duty to prevent 
another,s harm requires careful consideration of the consequences 
of imposing that duty for the parties and for society. Beach, 
726 P.2d at 418. We are loath to recognize a duty that is 
realistically incapable of performance or fundamentally at odds 
with the nature of the parties' relationship. Id. Accordingly, 
in determining the existence of a duty, we examine such factors 
as the identity and character of the actor, the victim, and the 
victimizer, the relationship of the actor to the victim and the 
victimizer, and the practical impact that finding a special 
relationship would have. See Rollins. 813 P.2d at 1160. As we 
explained in Beach: 
[I]t is meaningless to speak of "special 
relationships" and "duties" in the abstract. 
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These terms are only labels which the legal 
system applies to defined situations to 
indicate that certain rights and obligations 
flow from them; they are "an expression of 
the sum total of those considerations of 
policy which lead the law to say that a 
particular plaintiff is entitled to 
protection." 
Beach. 726 P.2d at 418 (quoting William Prosser, Law of Torts 333 
(3d ed. 1964)). 
In Beach. Ferree. and Rollins, we performed this sort 
of pragmatic, policy-based analysis in the context of claims that 
an injured party, as a member of a large undifferentiated group, 
such as a university student body (Beach) or the general public 
(Ferree and Rollins), was owed a duty by a defendant to protect 
the injured party from self-created dangers (Beach) or from 
injuries by third parties under the custody or control of the 
defendant (Ferree and Rollins). In each, we concluded that if 
the broad claim for a special relationship and the consequent 
duty was accepted, the defendant in question would be unable to 
perform the duty without either radically changing its character 
or drastically circumscribing the function it was charged with 
performing. Rollins. 813 P.2d at 1161; Ferree. 784 P.2d at 151; 
Beach. 726 P.2d at 419-20. 
A general principle can be drawn from these cases. In 
the context of a claim that an actor having custody or control of 
another owed a duty to prevent harm to or by that other, our 
overriding practical concern is whether the one causing the harm 
has shown him- or herself to be uniquely dangerous so that the 
actor upon whom the alleged duty would fall can be reasonably 
expected, consistent with the practical realities of that actor's 
relationship to the one in custody or under control, to 
distinguish that person from others similarly situated, to 
appreciate the unique threat this person presents, and to act to 
minimize or protect against that threat. When such circumstances 
are present, a special relationship can be said to exist and a 
duty sensibly may be imposed. E.g.. Rollins. 813 P.2d at 1162. 
It is important to recognize that in the above-
referenced cases, we did not reject the possibility of a duty 
flowing from these institutions to specific individuals or narrow 
classes of individuals who for some reason were distinguishable 
from the mass; we only rejected the claims for broad categories 
of special relationships which operatively seem to be 
indistinguishable from a general negligence theory. Id. at 1159-
62; Ferree. 784 P.2d at 151-52; Beach. 726 P.2d at 416. As we 
held in Rollins, this analysis produces results that appear to 
diverge from sections 314, 315, and 319 of the Restatement. 813 
P.2d at 1161-62. However, we think our approach is more 
realistic than that which would result from a broad reading of 
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the Restatement, especially when one considers the fact that at 
bottom, the issue is one of negligence—a lack of reasonable 
care—as opposed to what actions of others it would be nice to be 
insured against.5 
With this background in mind, we turn to the facts of 
this case. We begin with the question of whether defendants had 
a special relationship with Trujillo. Higgins argues that a 
special relationship exists between every therapist and every 
patient, the breach of which results in liability to anyone 
injured as a consequence. Therefore, she claims, each defendant 
has a special relationship with Trujillo that required committing 
or voluntarily admitting her. We reject this argument. Under 
the Beach/Ferree/Rollins analytical model, the fact that a 
relationship between one person and another can be characterized 
as "special" for some purposes does not determine whether that 
relation is special for purposes of imposing a tort duty in 
contravention of the general rule that one has no duty to control 
another person,s actions. As we noted in Beach, the 
characterization of a relationship as special is a conclusion, a 
label that announces the results of a policy analysis, not a 
substitute for analysis. 726 P.2d at 417-18. Higgins offers no 
analysis beyond labels to support her argument. 
Higgins's second special relationship theory is that 
defendants owed her and her daughter a duty to control Trujillo, 
5
 Defendants correctly argue that many courts have 
identified the actor's legal ability to control the third person 
as the factor that determines the existence of a special 
relationship. See, e.g., Hokansen v. United States. 868 F.2d 
372, 377 (10th Cir. 1989); Abernathv. 773 F.2d at 189-90; Hasenei 
v. United States. 541 F. Supp. 999, 1009 (D. Md. 1982); Cooke. 
735 P.2d at 836; Perreira v. State. 768 P.2d 1198, 1215-16 (Colo. 
1989); Johnson Estate v. Condell Memorial HOSP.. 520 N.E.2d 37, 
41 (111. 1988). Here, defendants contend that because Trujillo 
was a voluntary patient, they lacked the ability to control her 
and therefore could not have a special relationship with her. 
We have employed this legal-power-to-control analysis 
ourselves in certain cases. See Doe v. Arcruelles. 716 P.2d 279, 
282 (Utah 1985); Little v. Division of Family Servs.. 667 P.2d 
49, 54-55 (Utah 1983). At the same time, however, we have moved 
away from an exclusive reliance on this factor, just as we do not 
rely on the Restatement's mechanistic relational models in 
deciding whether a duty exists. Instead, we have concentrated on 
broader public policy concerns to determine whether the 
relationship gives rise to an affirmative duty to control 
another. See, e.g.. Rollins. 813 P.2d at 1161-62; Ferree. 784 
P.2d at 151; Beach. 726 P.2d at 418. The legal ability to 
control a third party may figure in this public policy analysis, 
but it is only one factor to consider and is not determinative of 
whether a special relationship exists. 
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a dangerous person, because of Trujillo's special relationship to 
defendants. Our decision in Rollins, which built upon Beach and 
Ferree. sets the standard that governs this issue. There, in the 
context of an action against the state hospital for harm caused 
to a member of the public by an escaped patient, we held that 
before we would impose a duty on a hospital to those harmed by a 
patient, it must be shown that the custodian knew or should have 
known that unless steps were taken to protect others from the 
detainee, he or she was "likely" to cause bodily harm to persons 
who were "reasonably identifiable by the custodian either 
individually or as members of a distinct group." Rollins. 813 
P.2d at 1162. We elaborated that "for a person or group to be 
reasonably identifiable, the bodily harm caused will be of a type 
that the custodian knew or should have known the detainee was 
likely to cause if not controlled." Id. We reasoned that when 
the theoretical danger of the one in custody became sufficiently 
crystallized that it took on a specific object and means, it 
became reasonable to impose a duty for two reasons: First, the 
detainee has been distinguished from the remainder of the 
population, and second, the identification of a victim and a 
means has made it feasible for the custodian to take concrete 
steps to prevent the harm. Id. 
This same test seems suited to the instant case. Here, 
the patient may be voluntary, but the other characteristics of 
the parties7 relationship are substantially similar to those in 
Rollins. The patient is mentally ill, presenting at least the 
potential of danger to self or others; the therapist is charged 
by his or her professional role to provide care for the patient 
in a confidential provider/patient relationship with a view 
toward recovery and return to normal life; and the therapist is 
legally restricted in using confinement to those situations in 
which the patient presents an identifiable danger to self or 
others and then must use the minimum level of confinement 
necessary. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-12-222, -234(10)(d), -
235(2), -241; O'Connor v. Donaldson. 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975). 
Limiting the duty to third parties who are "reasonably 
identifiable by the [therapist] either individually or as [a] 
member[] of a distinct group," Rollins. 813 P.2d at 1162, permits 
us, in most instances, to uphold the public policies of 
protecting the traditional confidentiality of the 
provider/patient relationship, which is important both for 
privacy reasons and for the efficacy of the therapeutic 
relationship. At the same time, it ensures the minimum use of 
involuntary commitment consistent with protecting identifiable 
potential victims. See Schopp & Wexler at 183; Robert F. Schopp 
& Michael R. Quattrocchi, Tarasoff. the Doctrine of Special 
Relationships and the Psychotherapist's Duty to Warn. J. 
Psychiatry & L. 13, 23 (Spring 1984) [hereinafter Schopp & 
Quattrocchi]; Fleming & Maximov at 1032; Beigler at 277; Mills at 
250-51. 
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Moreover, by adopting this standard for voluntary and 
involuntary health-care provider/patient relationships, we limit 
the duty to take steps to protect others by imposing a high level 
of confinement upon the patient to situations in which it is 
arguably possible for the therapist to distinguish between those 
who do present a real danger and those who do not. Any broader 
duty would be realistically incapable of performance. This 
consideration is important and, to a degree, implicitly underlies 
our decisions in Ferree and Rollins. The empirical evidence that 
has come to our attention is almost unanimous that dangerousness 
cannot be predicted with any degree of success. See, e.g., 
Schopp & Quattrocchi at 23. "Not only have psychologists and 
psychiatrists been unable to predict dangerousness to a degree of 
accuracy which would justify infringing on a client's rights, 
they have been unable to predict any more accurately than have 
nonprofessionals." Id.: Robert M. Wettstein, The Prediction of 
Violent Behavior and the Duty to Protect Third Parties, 2 Behav. 
Sciences & L. 291 (1984); accord Beigler at 280-82. For this 
reason, we limit the imposition of a duty to protect to those 
situations identified in Rollins in which there is an overt 
indication that the one in custody or under treatment is 
distinguishable from the mass of those in custody or under 
treatment, all of whom might be said in general terms to be 
dangerous to someone. See Schopp & Wexler at 173.6 
Applying this standard to the facts before us, we find 
that Trujillo never actually distinguished herself from the other 
potentially dangerous patients t^y threatening an identifiable 
victim., Trujillo's stabbing of an elderly woman three years 
TSef ore her attack on Shaundra did not make Shaundra an 
identifiable victim or even a member of a distinct, identifiable 
class. As far as the record reveals, Shaundra and the elderly 
woman had nothing in common but gender. The entire 
undifferentiated female half of the population does not comprise 
a distinct, identifiable group. 
However, this conclusion does not end the matter. 
While Trujillo may not have identified Shaundra as a potential 
victim, Higgins contends that if defendants had performed their 
professional responsibilities properly, Trujillo would have 
revealed Shaundra as a potential target. Higgins argues that 
Trujillo did not reveal her obsession with Shaundra because of 
6
 Although we reach this holding solely on common law 
grounds, we note that this result is consistent with legislation 
enacted five years after Shaundra was stabbed. That statute 
provides, "A therapist has no duty to warn or take precautions to 
provide protection from any violent behavior of his [or her] 
client or patient, except when that client or patient 
communicated to the therapist an actual threat of physical 
violence against a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable 
victim." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102(1) (emphasis added). 
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defendants' negligent treatment and therefore that negligence 
should not excuse defendants from a duty that would have arisen 
had they acted in accordance with the appropriate standard of 
care. Otherwise, they say, care providers would have an 
incentive to avoid diagnostically appropriate examinations that 
could reveal specific threats and give rise to a special 
relationship and the consequent duty to the potential victim. 
As stated in Rollins, we will find a special 
relationship and consequent duty when a defendant knew of the 
likely danger to an individual or distinct group of individuals 
or when a defendant should have known of such danger.7 813 P.2d 
at 1162. In the context of the present case, if the steps taken 
by defendants were not reasonable in light of Trujillo/s symptoms 
and if reasonable action would have revealed that Trujillo was 
likely to inflict grievous bodily harm on Shaundra, then a 
special relationship would arise. Higgins/s factual allegation 
that proper examination and diagnosis would have disclosed that 
Trujillo was brooding over Shaundra and had targeted her for an 
attack presents a sufficient claim that a duty existed. 
Consequently, the trial court should not have granted summary 
judgment for defendants on the duty issue. 
Having concluded that the trial court erred in basing 
its summary judgment on the lack of duty, we must next address a 
question not reached by the trial court: Are defendants immune 
from suit under the provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act 
("the Act11)? 
In structure, the Act grants immunity to all persons 
performing governmental functions but then withdraws that 
immunity for certain persons under certain circumstances and 
£grfa*4*L^Y^p+-J^g- nfc*tv (win Amr 5 f n m i . fffnth plninfiff'T 
and defendants agree that UMC and SLCMH were performing*-
governmental functions within the meaning of the Act^j Therefore, 
they are immune from suit unless the Act waives that immunity and/ 
£ioes not provide an applicable exception to that waivejr. JV^ T 
The Act waives immunity for an "injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury . . . 
(b) arises out of assault, battery . . . ." Id. § 63-30-10(1)(b) 
(1986) (now codified at § 63-30-10(2)) (emphasis added). 
Defendants contend that the Act bars Higgins's claim because 
7
 We emphasize here that the phrase "should have known" 
should not be construed to require that a health-care provider 
take measures not otherwise indicated by the apparent symptoms of 
the patient. As we noted earlier, we decline to impose any 
additional duty on the health-care provider that would distort 
the traditional relationship between the provider and patient and 
the provider's duty to that patient. 
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Shaundra's injuries and Higgins's mental distress arose out of 
Trujillo,s assault and battery. Higgins responds that section 
63-30-10 does not preserve immunity for injuries arising from an 
assault or battery if the assailant is not a governmental 
employee. 
Under the logic of Ledfors v. Emery County School 
District, 209 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (March 19, 1993), we find 
Biggins's argument to be without merit. First, by its plain 
language, section 63-30-10 preserves immunity for negligence that 
results in an "injury . . . [that] arises out of [an] assault, 
[or] battery . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(b) (1986) 
(now codified at § 63-30-10(2)). The statute simply does not 
contain the distinction on which Higgins stakes her claim. In 
fact, its language suggests that the legislature contemplated no 
such distinction. The section in question provides that the 
negligence of a governmental employee is not actionable when, as 
a result of that negligence, an assault or battery is committed 
by another. Nothing suggests that the one committing the assault 
or battery need be a government employee, and the entire focus of 
the subsection is upon the negligent government employee, not on 
the intentionally acting assailant. Because it is the negligence 
of the governmental employee upon which any claim of liability 
must rest, it would make no sense to engraft upon that waiver a 
limitation based upon the status of the assailant. 
We also note that Higgins cites no Utah authority for 
her position. Nor could she. When we have considered claims 
that the state's negligence permitted an assault by a person who 
was not a state employee, we have held uniformly that the state 
is immune. See, e.g., Ledfors, 209 Utah Adv. Rep. at 5-6; 
Maddocks v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 740 P.2d 1337, 1339 (Utah 
1987); Madsen v. State. 583 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1978); Eotina v. 
State, 546 P.2d 242, 244 (Utah 1976); Emerv v. State, 26 Utah 2d 
1, 2, 483 P.2d 1296, 1297 (1971); Sheffield v. Turner. 21 Utah 2d 
314, 316-17, 445 P.2d 367, 368-69 (Utah 1969); see also Kirk v. 
State, 784 P.2d 1255, 1256-57 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Accordingly, we follow Ledfors and hold that section 
63-30-10 bars a suit against a governmental entity for injuries 
alleged to have been caused by negligence that results in an 
assault or battery, whether or not the assailant is a government 
employee. Here, the injuries alleged to flow from the negligence 
of the governmental defendants all stem from a battery— 
Trujillo/s stabbing of Shaundra. Consequently, section 63-30-10 
bars this action. Therefore, although we hold that the trial 
court erred in basing a grant of summary judgment on the lack of 
duty, governmental immunity presents an independent ground for 
affirming the decision below. See Hill, 827 P.2d at 246. 
We affirm the judgment of the district court. 










Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Howe, Associate Chief Justice, concurs in the result. 
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